One of the main gaps in Brazilian political system literature is the
absence of a pluralist approach to the interest groups system. All
studies were restricted to an analytical model based on the principle
that Brazil adopts a interest group system characterized by the State
corporatism (or authoritarian corporatism) approach, in which interest
groups and lobby strategies, in plural sense, mean an oxymoron. However,
in recent studies, can be seen alternative approaches that consider
constitutional design transformations dealing with the concept of a
Brazilian hybrid interest group system. In fact, Diniz & Boschi
(2004), Mancuso (2007) and Santos (2011) show the existence of a strong
influence of interest groups in Brazilian political system, when
analyzing industrial interests lobbying, but such approaches did focus
only to executive and/or legislative branches. This research goes
forward to the strengthening of pluralist perspective introducing
evidences of a demand for industrial interest dispute resolution in
Brazilian Supreme Court environment. The paper analyses constitutional
actions (ADINs) suited by the National Industry Union (CNI), relating
the judicial claims with the industrial legislative agenda. In other
words, seeks to empirically estimate to what extent the industrial lobby
represents a rent-seeking behavior and reflects the judicialization of
political disputes.
http://ipsa.org/sites/default/files/ipsa-events/madrid2012/papers/paper-17374-2012-06-15-1722.pdf
Ferramenta multimídia de apoio ao ensino de disciplinas vinculadas ao instituto jurídico do processo no curso de Direito na Universidade Católica de Pernambuco - UNICAP e na Faculdade Damas da Instrução Cristã - FADIC.
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23/07/2012
Watching the Watchmen: Brazilian Supreme Court's Chief Justice Role in Checking Lower Court's Judicial Activism
The tension between political branches of government derives from checks
and balances institutions in constitutional regimes, providing points
of judicial activism in relevant political issues, in a phenomena that
we got used to call judicialization of politics. In Brazilian legal
system, the increasing application of the writ of suspension - a
procedural instrument created to guarantee policy and legal stability
and to block all divergent judicial decisions in lower court level -
appears as a reaction to the judicialization of political issues
favouring Executive branch interests. Such institutional tool empowers
Court's Chief Justice to guarantee that public policies that reflect
Executive's political preferences remain unaffected despite divergent
judicial decisions from lower courts, basically arguing plausible
violations from judicial acts to public order, economy, health or
security. Consists in a reverse judicial review exercise in which
judicial organs are object of institutional checks, in order to prevent
private benefits from public policies damages. This research focuses on
the analysis of Brazilian Supreme Court's Chief Justice decisions on
writ of suspension, showing her role in stopping or preserving public
policies.
http://ipsa.org/sites/default/files/ipsa-events/madrid2012/papers/paper-6512-2012-05-23-1442.pdf
http://ipsa.org/sites/default/files/ipsa-events/madrid2012/papers/paper-6512-2012-05-23-1442.pdf
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