Defesa de dissertação de Luis Filipe Andrade Barbosa

OS DONOS DO PODER: A OAB E O SEU PAPEL NA REVISÃO JUDICIAL CONCENTRADA.

RESUMO

A literatura política brasileira (Carvalho Neto, 2005; Sadek & Dantas, 2000) destacou a forte influência de advogados e profissões jurídicas no desenho constitucional ao longo do tempo, especialmente após a promulgação da Constituição Federal Brasileira de 1988. Uma característica fundamental deste ambiente é o papel da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB) como membro de um grupo muito restrito de atores que têm permissão constitucional para provocar o Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro e iniciar a revisão judicial abstrata. Embora outros atores, como as Uniões Sindicais de âmbito nacional e/ou partidos políticos, tenham o dever de justificar a existência de um nexo formal entre a sua natureza e a questão política objeto de disputa (pertinência temática, em termos técnicos), a OAB tem a prerrogativa constitucional para propor as ações constitucionais sobre qualquer tema de disputa política. Então, qual é a relevância das ações constitucionais da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil no cenário da judicialização da política? Esta pesquisa pretende responder a esta pergunta através da análise de um grande banco de dados sobre as ações diretas de inconstitucionalidade (ADI) e da busca de evidências empíricas sobre o papel desempenhado pela OAB na arena política da revisão judicial.

Palavras-chave: Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil. Judicialização da política. Ações diretas de inconstitucionalidade.






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Plataforma Democrática

Publicações: Plataforma Democrática.

http://www.plataformademocratica.org/PublicacoesPlataforma.aspx#JournalDemocracy



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Linguagem & Direito

IPSA Summer School - São Paulo 2013

IPSA Summer School - São Paulo 2013


January 21, 2013 - February 8, 2013
University of São Paulo
São Paulo, Brazil

The goal of this program is to provide scholars of the social sciences with access to high-quality, cutting edge, advanced training in qualitative and quantitative social science methods. The target group is high-potential, upper-level scholars of political science, international relations, and related disciplines. Preference will be given to current faculty members, post-doctoral and doctoral students. Truly exceptional masters’ students in political science, international relations, and closely related fields will also be considered.

http://summerschool.fflch.usp.br/


Academic objectives:
This program aims to provide basic training in three general areas:

quantitative data analysis,
qualitative data analysis, and
research design and methods.
It is hoped that participants will be able to return to their home institutions with greatly enhanced methodological skills, having built bridges with peers from other institutions and nations, and with the potential to disseminate these skills effectively among their peers.

We seek a varied student body, with representation from as many countries and methodological backgrounds as possible. Our three first Summer Schools, held in February 2010, 2011 and 2012, brought together students from 10, 16 and 15 different countries, respectively. One-fifth of the students were current faculty members, and half were doctoral students. In the 2012 season, the School received 133 students.



Institutional Partners:
The Summer School is a partnership between the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the Department of Political Science (DCP), the Institute for International Relations (IRI) at the University of São Paulo and the Brazilian Association of Political Science (ABCP).

Generous support for the 2010, 2011 and 2012 Summer Schools was provided by the IPSA, by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES), by the University of São Paulo, by FAPESP and by the Centro de Estudos da Metrópole (CEM).


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PhDComics - Orientadores

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Portal da transparência

Criado em 2004, o “Portal da Transparência” garante ao cidadão o direito de monitorar a utilização da verba pública. A página é um grande guia sobre toda a execução orçamentária e financeira do país. E você pode ter acesso a tudo isso.

http://www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br/manual/

http://glo.bo/N4M3dl




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Improbidade administrativa no Brasil em perspectiva comparada

Resumo

O principal objetivo desse trabalho é analisar a improbidade administrativa no Brasil em perspectiva comparada. O foco repousa sobre o tempo de tramitação das sentenças condenatórias nos tribunais estaduais. Além disso, desenvolvemos uma medida padronizada de severidade judicial. Metodologicamente, o desenho de pesquisa combina estatística descritiva e multivariada com análise documental (legislação). Os dados foram coletados a partir do Cadastro Nacional de Improbidade Administrativa, organizado pelo Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ). Os resultados sugerem que: a) em média, uma sentença sobre improbidade administrativa demora cerca de 5,29 anos para ser produzida com um desvio padrão de 2,84; b) Alagoas é o estado que mais lentamente julga os processos de improbidade (9 anos); e c) Tocantins é unidade da federação onde o tempo entre a propositura da ação e a data de transitado e julgado da sentença toma menos tempo (3,8 anos).

Palavras-chave: improbidade administrativa; corrupção; morosidade judicial.

Abstract

The principal aim of this paper is to analyze administrative impropriety in Brazil in a comparative perspective. The focus regards the time of condemnatory sentences in subnational level courts. In addition, we develop a standardized measure of judicial punishment. Methodologically, the research design combines both descriptive and multivariate statistics with documental analysis (legislation). Data were collected based on the Cadastro Nacional de Improbidade Administrativa, a database organized by the Brazilian National Council of Justice (CNJ). The results suggest the following: a) on average; a administrative impropriety judicial sentence takes 5,29 years to be judged with a standard deviation of 2,84; b) Alagoas is the state the takes longer to judge its impropriety cases (9 years); and c) Tocantins is the state that faster judges its cases (3,8 years).

Keywords: administrative improperly; corruption; judicial delay.

Dalson Britto Figueiredo Filho (UFPE) (dalsonbritto@yahoo.com.br)

Enivaldo Carvalho da Rocha (UFPE) (eni-rocha@hotmail.com)

Jose Mario Wanderley Gomes (UNICAP/UFPE) (jmariow@hotmail.com)

Ranulfo Paranhos (UFAL)
(ranulfoparanhos@me.com)


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Paper

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Interactions between the Brazilian Supreme Court and the National Industry Union in Corporative Political Disputes

One of the main gaps in Brazilian political system literature is the absence of a pluralist approach to the interest groups system. All studies were restricted to an analytical model based on the principle that Brazil adopts a interest group system characterized by the State corporatism (or authoritarian corporatism) approach, in which interest groups and lobby strategies, in plural sense, mean an oxymoron. However, in recent studies, can be seen alternative approaches that consider constitutional design transformations dealing with the concept of a Brazilian hybrid interest group system. In fact, Diniz & Boschi (2004), Mancuso (2007) and Santos (2011) show the existence of a strong influence of interest groups in Brazilian political system, when analyzing industrial interests lobbying, but such approaches did focus only to executive and/or legislative branches. This research goes forward to the strengthening of pluralist perspective introducing evidences of a demand for industrial interest dispute resolution in Brazilian Supreme Court environment. The paper analyses constitutional actions (ADINs) suited by the National Industry Union (CNI), relating the judicial claims with the industrial legislative agenda. In other words, seeks to empirically estimate to what extent the industrial lobby represents a rent-seeking behavior and reflects the judicialization of political disputes.

http://ipsa.org/sites/default/files/ipsa-events/madrid2012/papers/paper-17374-2012-06-15-1722.pdf

Watching the Watchmen: Brazilian Supreme Court's Chief Justice Role in Checking Lower Court's Judicial Activism

The tension between political branches of government derives from checks and balances institutions in constitutional regimes, providing points of judicial activism in relevant political issues, in a phenomena that we got used to call judicialization of politics. In Brazilian legal system, the increasing application of the writ of suspension - a procedural instrument created to guarantee policy and legal stability and to block all divergent judicial decisions in lower court level - appears as a reaction to the judicialization of political issues favouring Executive branch interests. Such institutional tool empowers Court's Chief Justice to guarantee that public policies that reflect Executive's political preferences remain unaffected despite divergent judicial decisions from lower courts, basically arguing plausible violations from judicial acts to public order, economy, health or security. Consists in a reverse judicial review exercise in which judicial organs are object of institutional checks, in order to prevent private benefits from public policies damages. This research focuses on the analysis of Brazilian Supreme Court's Chief Justice decisions on writ of suspension, showing her role in stopping or preserving public policies.

http://ipsa.org/sites/default/files/ipsa-events/madrid2012/papers/paper-6512-2012-05-23-1442.pdf